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In this project, I argue that J. Edgar Hoover’s style of political realism should be
studied by critics because it long preceded that of President Harry S. Truman. The
style belonged to a stockpile of anti-Communist imagery that helped to shape how
the Truman Doctrine speech was drafted and how audiences interpreted its
meanings in more local domestic politics. When Truman fınally announced that
the Soviet Union had challenged international protocol, I argue that he confırmed
the vision that his Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director and other
detractors had developed throughout the New Deal to discredit reformers who
challenged issues of race, labor, and police technique. In this way, anti-Communist
containment rhetoric limited the president’s ability to control the domestic security
and economic agendas. The stockpile of anti-Communist discourse belonged to, I also
argue, a relative of political realism—literary realism and its spinoff, literary naturalism. My fınal argument is that the FBI director refurbished key tropes in the
stockpile, which helped Truman’s congressional opponents invoke Hoover’s authority within the executive branch and thereby displace the president’s credibility
as commander in chief. Combined, Hoover and his allies in Congress and elsewhere used rhetorical realism to communicate a deterministic philosophy about
human nature through a diffuse mythic narrative, coordinated between Congress, Hollywood, the press, and offıcial FBI discourse.
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hen President Harry S. Truman delivered the Truman Doctrine speech before Congress on March 12, 1947, he closed
his remarks with an ornamental statement that was uncharacteristic of his plain style.1 He fırst introduced the problems of “subjugation by armed minorities” and “outside pressures” as well as that of “such
subterfuges as political infıltration.” He then drew a biological analogy to
belligerence that highlighted the problem of Communist expansion.
“The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want,” he
argued. “They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They
reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has
died.”2 Rather than limit where the Soviet Union might spread its influence
to faraway places, the president implied otherwise when he issued Executive
Order 9835 on March 22. The order decreed that “the presence within the
Government service of any disloyal or subversive person constitutes a threat
to our democratic processes” and therefore ordered a loyalty investigation
of all current members of, and future applicants to, the executive branch.
Among other things, these reviews were to include reference to “Federal
Bureau of Investigation fıles.”3 The president appeared before Congress
to help defend Greece and Turkey from Soviet belligerence. The juxtaposition of these two texts, however, led some to mistakenly conclude that the purpose of the speech was to prepare the way for loyalty
investigations.4
In the same timeframe, Truman’s rival in the FBI also used biological and
naturalist discourse to discuss the spread of Soviet ideology. J. Edgar Hoover
told the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) on March
26 that communism was a “way of life—an evil and malignant way of life. It
reveal[ed] a condition akin to disease that spreads like an epidemic and like
an epidemic a quarantine [was] necessary to keep it from infecting the
Nation.” Like Truman, Hoover also warned against political infıltration. He
advocated for the “necessity of alertness in keeping Communists and sympathizers out of Government services.” The FBI director made clear that
Communists did not “have a right to Government jobs.” By authority of the
“Hatch Act,” Hoover boasted that the FBI had already ensured that a “total
of 1,906 individuals [were] no longer employed in the Government.” They
were removed before they could spread the “virus of communism” under
the “window dressing” of “old-age security, houses for veterans, child
assistance,” and other social-democratic New Deal programs.5 Hoover’s
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remarks to HUAC worked intertextually with his previous discourses, and
with the statements of Republicans and Southern Democrats hostile to the
president, to situate the Truman Doctrine speech in a context that worked
against social-democratic New Dealers, with their support of organized
labor and civil rights legislation.6 Richard Gid Powers concludes that
Hoover’s speech signifıed a transfer of loyalty from the Oval Offıce to
congressional conservatives.7
Rhetorical critics have already examined how the Truman Doctrine
speech helped to displace political idealism with realism. Denise M. Bostdorff observes that Truman attempted to balance his own entrenched
commitments to lofty ideals with the apparent necessity of adopting a more
realistic interpretation of Soviet actions. She contends that the administration’s perceptions were constrained by a “rhetoric of the past—and the
reality that it had generated.”8 Moreover, Martin J. Medhurst suggests that
the speech shattered the president’s reticence about how American-Soviet
relations had soured after the war. His previous silence created a vacuum of
presidential rhetoric about international relations that was fılled by opponents who set the agenda with xenophobic anticommunism. Medhurst
concludes that Truman had trapped himself with his “prior commitment to
an idealistic world and the rhetorical reticence entailed by that vision,” and
so he entered the debate on communism, subversion, and loyalty too late
and “found himself a prisoner of historical events.”9
The Truman Doctrine speech has also been examined in terms of how it
fıt a naturalist language pattern. Bostdorff and Robert L. Ivie illustrate how
White House speech writers embedded metaphors of natural phenomena
like fıre, flood, and fever within the text, which borrowed from an antiCommunist stockpile of imagery that highlighted visions of health and
disease.10 Similarly, Paul A. Chilton suggests that the fınalized text was
structured according to preliminary drafts that featured infectious disease
metaphors and container images. He links containment rhetoric to a container schema in security logic, which entails an interior, boundary surface,
and exterior. National borders fıguratively separate insiders from outsiders
and maintain order by limiting movement. The boundary surface is frequently personifıed as a human body, and disease as something that infıltrates the boundary to attack and disrupt interior organs.11 The language
adopted by the administration, the linguist concludes, created the “impression of a naturally based description,” which influenced how policy was
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drafted.12 Whereas biological imagery placed humans in a Darwinian contest for survival, container discourse suggested how the spread of a biosocial
problem could be stopped.
While Truman kept silent about Soviet belligerence for almost two years
(April 1945–March 1947), his FBI director spent that time and many years
beforehand publicly warning of a vast conspiracy in naturalist terms that
shaped how Americans would experience the Cold War at home. Republicans and Southern Democrats praised and repeated the FBI director’s
warnings against the New Deal in the timeframe of the Truman Doctrine
speech. Republicans appreciated how Hoover’s discourse made the government’s support of organized labor vulnerable to fears of Communist infıltration. For Southern Democrats, such rhetoric weakened the momentum
of social-democratic New Dealers who wanted to integrate the South.13
When the postwar crisis emerged, Hoover was ready to use the international situation as a context to help reform domestic politics according to
the more exclusive value structure of Anglo-American nationalism.
Unlike Truman, Hoover defıned the problem of Soviet expansion in
ways that stretched into the orbit of mass culture, organized labor, and race
relations. The FBI director warned that “the poisonous pills of Communist
propaganda” were disbursed by Hollywood. Moscow had allegedly inserted
lines, scenes, and sequences into fılms that conveyed the “Communist
lesson,” and had worked to censor “anti-Communist lessons.” The Kremlin
supposedly accomplished this message campaign by ordering American
Communists to infıltrate labor unions and the arts.14 The FBI director
shared an interest in the fılm industry with HUAC. Both the FBI and
committee members investigated Hollywood fılmmakers in search of Communist agents, and both identifıed fılms with social-democratic themes like
It’s a Wonderful Life (1946) as Communist propaganda.15 According to
Hoover, the purpose of the propaganda and infıltration strategies was to
exploit workers and African Americans in a Communist uprising. Hoover
quoted Vladimir Lenin to argue that the ultimate objective was revolution,
“by exerting pressure from without as a political movement . . . ‘The economic strike develops into a political strike and the latter develops into
insurrection’” to “overthrow the American way of life” and for the “overthrow of our Government.”16 Hoover, moreover, saw in the fılm industry a
resource to tell far-flung stories about the FBI. His publicists worked relent-
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lessly during the New Deal to help script urban-crime and fılm noir movies
that framed the bureau in terms of realistic fıction.17
Hoover’s style of political realism should be studied by critics because it
long preceded that of the president. The style helped to shape how the
Truman Doctrine speech was drafted and how audiences interpreted its
meanings in more local domestic politics. When Truman fınally announced
that the Soviet Union had challenged international protocol, I argue that he
confırmed the vision that his FBI director and other detractors had developed throughout the New Deal to discredit reformers who challenged issues
of race, labor, and police technique. In this way, anti-Communist containment rhetoric limited the president’s ability to control the domestic security
and economic agendas. The stockpile of anti-Communist discourse belonged to, I also argue, a relative of political realism—literary realism and its
spinoff, literary naturalism.18 My fınal argument is that the FBI director
refurbished key tropes in the stockpile, which helped Truman’s congressional opponents invoke Hoover’s authority within the executive branch and
thereby displace the president’s credibility as commander in chief. Combined, Hoover and his allies in Congress and elsewhere used rhetorical
realism to communicate a deterministic philosophy about human nature
through a diffuse mythic narrative, coordinated between Congress, Hollywood, the press, and more offıcial FBI discourse. In what follows, I discuss
the relationship between political and literary realisms. I then focus on how
anti-Communists used the pattern to frame the Truman Doctrine speech
against the New Deal. This backdrop allows for an examination of how
rhetorical realism constructed idealistic, social-democratic New Dealers as
Communist dupes that needed to be culturally contained by AngloAmerican nationalists.

POLITICAL AND LITERARY MODES OF REALISM
Political and literary realisms share key formal attributes that are related
to similar functional properties. Realistic fıction emerged as a popular
genre in the years following the Civil War and would, in time, heavily
influence early fılm genres that focused on cowboys, gangsters, and
spies. With the emphasis of these genres, not surprisingly, the language
of fılm noir offered a framework for twentieth-century political realists
to communicate a deterministic philosophy of human nature and the
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kind of law enforcement and national security that it necessitated.
Indeed, both realisms shared a common philosophy and were drafted in
response to respective idealisms.19 What policy planners took as natural
divisions between manliness and domesticity, between reality and naïveté,
between what was essentially American and what was foreign, were patterns
sown deep into Anglo-American culture by generations of artists who
attempted to adapt their world to the stresses of mass urbanization, immigration, and industrialization.
The rise of political realism as the dominant American foreign policy
paradigm is rooted in the historical experience of German belligerence in
World Wars I and II and the pressure to reorganize the world in a way that
would prevent the pattern of global catastrophe from repeating. The Truman Doctrine speech sits in a key place in the canon of realist texts because
it announced a new direction in foreign policy planning after the idealist
paradigm had collapsed under the gravity of the Axis powers. The rhetoric
of political realism conceptualizes the nation-state as the primary unit of
action in world politics and the commander in chief as the state’s centralized
authority. This philosophy suggests that nation-states naturally exist in a
condition of anarchy and are thus forced to defıne their foreign policy
objectives in terms of a more singular national interest that can be achieved
by diplomatic and military power. Such singularity benefıts the dominant
groups that control the nation’s strategic resources, as the dominant group’s
needs are viewed as the needs of the nation.20 Conformity was insisted upon
in issues of race, class, sexuality, and gender because of fear that Communists would exploit differences in U.S. multicultural life to destabilize order.
Preserving dominant cultural hierarchies thus became a matter of national
security in what has been described as Cold War containment culture.21
Realists naturalized their perspective in response to the rhetorical patterns of political idealism. Planners frequently dismissed idealistic discourse with claims that it was naïvely sentimental, moralistic, utopian,
legalistic, rhetorical, or partisan. These missives contrasted idealism with
more realistic discourse, which implied that the latter was grounded outside
of language or was extratextual. Because idealism was unreal and existed
only on paper, argued realists, the mistakes it caused could be contained by
limiting the spread of its symbolism.22 Realism grew, in part, from the
experience of realists with Wilsonian idealism and its advocates during the
interwar era. The idealists, for example, placed their faith in the rationality
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and basic goodness of white people, in the belief of a harmony of interests
between white Christian nations, and in the possibility of an absolute form
of justice.23 Idealists even viewed oppositional ideology and radical activities as forms of protected speech, and they reframed law enforcement and
prison as a means to reform the criminal.24 Their emphasis on harmony and
goodness lent a helpful political value to racial, economic, and religious
minorities interested in social equality.
These values extended from President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen
Points. Although he supported racial segregation in America, his foreign
policy framework promoted a democratic world order, open diplomacy,
free trade, labor safeguards, disarmament, and national autonomy.25 The
general failure of the League of Nations to maintain order soon raised
skepticism about its feasibility. E. H. Carr suggested in 1939, for example,
that “wishing prevails over thinking” in idealism and that the outbreak of
war “revealed the inadequacy of pure aspiration” as the framework of
politics and scholarship. Instead, he argued that planners should analyze
“political reality” to correct the “wish-dreams” of political idealism and
encouraged a more realistic perspective that would emphasize the irresistible strength of force.26
The rhetoric of twentieth-century political realism appropriated key
patterns from realistic fıction. In the decades following the Civil War,
writers of literary realism and naturalism presented themselves akin to
ethnographers, anthropologists, linguists, psychologists, sociologists, and
other supposedly neutral scientifıc experts of their day.27 They worked to
outline the problems of urbanization, immigration, and industrialization,
which political reformers were expected to address. Realist writers and their
audiences experienced the genres of realism and naturalism as representative of the world they inhabited. Readers and writers believed that they
could come into contact with the kinds of villains and problems portrayed
in their stories.28
In the Progressive Era, naturalists turned their backs on the previous
generation of literary realists. Naturalists sometimes referred to the fıction
of their forebears as “teacup tragedies” and thereby ridiculed a previous
focus on domestic life. Naturalists failed to see irony in that the fırst
generation of literary realists distinguished themselves from their own
predecessors along similarly gendered lines.29 Male writers pioneered realism soon after the Civil War and thereby challenged the feminine associa-

460

RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS

tions of novelists before the war. Novel writing became a respectable
profession for men at a time when America suffered from the posttraumatic
stresses of war. These realists denigrated the work of women novelists to
justify their own. They jeered the work of women as mere sentimentalism
when it invoked idealistic Christian virtues like peace, joy, grace, hope,
mercy, and charity. Such literary idealism was flawed, they argued, because
it presupposed the possibility of universal truth as well as harmony between
different types of peoples.30 Instead, realists imagined a world marked by
agony and conflict. They raided the language of biological science, especially Charles Darwin’s The Descent of Man (1872), to imagine public life in
terms of competition for survival.31
At the turn of the century, naturalists went still further and infused the
genre with the frontier myth to create what was then called “red-blooded
realism.”32 These writers located their stories at sea, in deserts, on mountaintops, among other archetypal frontier settings, and even imagined
urban centers as a new frontier that needed to be reclaimed from foreign,
non-Anglo, working class inhabitants.33 Writers used a rich array of metaphors to imagine marginal groups in terms of brutes, savages, disease, and
animals. They grounded their discourses in scientifıc theories on race and
eugenics and cultivated fantasies of criminality, genetic defıciencies, political conspiracies, and threats to national security.34 Richard Slotkin argues
that naturalism communicated the frontier myth. Beginning with the Puritans, stories of survival in the wilderness were told and retold over centuries,
and their recurring elements were eventually abstracted and reduced to
icons, keywords, symbols, and clichés. As such, they circulated in naturalist
stories as metaphors and thereby constructed historical situations in mythic
terms. When fragments of rustic or natural imagery from the nation’s past
were placed in narratives about American cultural conflict, the language
activated a sense of cosmological being and purpose that traced back to the
Puritan mission into the wilderness.35 Though the naturalist novel was
largely confıned to the Progressive Era, its conventions were transferred to
cinema, fırst in Westerns, then in the urban-crime fılms of the 1930s, and
then in the spy vs. spy of fılm noir at the end of the decade, which remained
popular throughout the wartime and Cold War eras.
Without identifying its literary origins, critics have already documented
how the language and logic of naturalism preceded the Cold War and laid in
wait as a stockpile of anti-Communist imagery. Lynn Boyd Hinds and
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Theodore Otto Windt Jr. describe a “rhetorical prism through which Americans viewed the Soviets” that was “refracted by the American self-image, a
blending of the political and the religious that portrayed America as a
people with a special relationship to God” and placed American and Soviet
“manifest destinies” in rhetorical competition with each other. The scholars
cite fıgurative language grounded in the natural environment that was
deployed against organized labor during the fırst red scare of the twentieth
century (1919–20) and then again against the New Deal, which helped to
link alien doctrines and domestic radicals.36 Bostdorff observes that the
Truman Doctrine speech’s reliance upon this “rhetorical stockpile of antiCommunist words and images from the American past made Truman’s
message compelling in the short term but simultaneously seemed to verify
earlier right-wing attacks on the administration.” In fact, dissenters to the
president’s foreign policy message were soon dismissed as naïve, idealistic,
or Communist sympathizers by Hoover, congressional conservatives, and
others of their ilk.37
Critics have also examined some of Hoover’s rhetorical and media strategies. One of my earlier studies illustrates how the FBI director worked
closely with the press during the Roosevelt administration’s war on crime
(1933–38) to reframe federal law enforcement in militaristic language and
thereby elevated himself in the political-cultural hierarchy.38 I also link
Hoover’s Cold War discourse to his experience with the FBI’s campaign
against radicals during the Palmer Raids and the First Red Scare.39 Moreover, Matthew Cecil focuses on Hoover’s relationship with the press
throughout his career. Cecil argues that no other organization “could match
the cultural capital of Hoover’s FBI” with the thousands of FBI stories that
“appeared in newspapers, magazines, comic strips, radio programs, and
motion pictures, and ultimately on television. Most of those stories were
produced with the assistance” of the FBI.40 He writes elsewhere that the FBI
represented itself in “articles, books, radio dramas, and motion pictures” as
a “responsible and even reluctant, logical, and deductive law enforcement
agency.” This image obscured FBI abuses of power.41
Hoover’s rhetorical leadership has also been examined in terms of his
gendered performances. Charles E. Morris, for example, argues that the
director’s “sexual identity was signifıcant to FBI policy in the years prior to
Hoover’s Cold War dominance.”42 The current study examines mediated
gendered constraints placed by anti-Communist frameworks on the rhetorical
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presidency. I argue that Hoover helped saturate mass culture with realistic
rhetoric, that the presence and authority of his discourse was amplifıed by
Truman’s congressional opponents and the press who often repeated it, and
that Hoover’s core anti-New Deal message and its delivery system extended
the Truman Doctrine speech into the realm of race and class politics.

NATURALIST DISCOURSE AND THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY
When Hoover deployed naturalist discourse in his March 1947 speech to
HUAC, he perpetuated a style that he fırst adopted in the early years of the
New Deal to describe police and prison reformers. This origin reveals a
framework that was valued because the style rebutted a perspective that
insisted upon restraint in law enforcement, especially with how law enforcement treated immigrants. When Southern Democrats began to defect from
the New Deal, the style helped frame their clash with social-democratic New
Dealers as one between patriotism and disloyalty. The style was so flexible,
in part, because it was fırst used by Hollywood to structure discourse in
urban-crime fılms and then again to describe the problem of espionage in
fılm noir just a few years later. The language system would frame, in part, the
Truman Doctrine speech in ways that conflated domestic politics with the
international situation and thereby helped to malign the New Deal.
After he issued Executive Order 9835, Truman advised the Loyalty
Review Board to limit the role of the FBI in an attempt to curtail Hoover’s
influence.43 Truman would learn over the course of his presidency, however, that Hoover had amassed too much rhetorical power to be controlled.
The FBI engaged in an unfriendly competition with the Civil Service Commission over jurisdiction for loyalty reviews. George Elsey, assistant to
Clark Clifford, the special counsel to the president, noted in May 1947 that
Truman felt “very strongly anti-FBI” and sided with the Civil Service
commissioners. He added that Truman wanted to constrain the FBI because
he was “afraid” of building up a “Gestapo.”44 Truman confırmed this view
and acknowledged that he feared anti-Communist hysteria. The president
mistakenly appointed a Hoover loyalist from the Department of Justice to
chair the Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty. Clifford wrote
weeks later to the president that the chair was making “mountains out of
molehills” in a successful attempt to make the FBI “fully responsible for all
investigations in every case in which there [was] a suspicion of disloyalty in
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an applicant for Federal employment.” Truman wrote in the margin of this
memo that “J. Edgar will in all probability get this backward looking
Congress to give him what he wants. It’s dangerous.”45
The president had distrusted the FBI director since his time in the Senate.
In his fırst term (1935–41), Truman worked with chief counsel Max Lowenthal of the Interstate Commerce Committee (ICC), chaired by Burton
K. Wheeler (D-MT), who was victimized by the Teapot Dome scandal. In
1923, the Bureau of Investigation tapped Wheeler’s phone, opened his mail,
broke into his offıce, and “even attempted to lure Wheeler into a compromising sexual liaison,” observes Athan G. Theoharis.46 The scandal forced
the closure of young Hoover’s antiradical unit, created by Attorney General
A. Mitchell Palmer in 1919 amid the red scare.47
Lowenthal’s research helped the ICC connect Hoover’s new wartime
power with controversies that besieged his bureau in the 1920s and jeopardized his authority afterward.48 With Teapot Dome fresh in mind, President Herbert Hoover used his 1929 State of the Union address to inaugurate
the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement. It was
chaired by former Attorney General George W. Wickersham (1909–13) and
employed Lowenthal as its executive secretary. President Hoover called for
the “widest inquiry into the shortcomings of the administration of justice
and into the causes and remedies for them.” He also wanted to promote a
new system that would prepare prisoners “for return to duties of citizenship.”49 The commission reported in 1931 on “lawlessness in law enforcement” and condemned the use of torture against marginal groups. With
Lowenthal’s help, Wickersham reprimanded police offıcials for a “secret
and illegal practice” identifıed as the “third-degree,” which inflicted “suffering, physical or mental, upon a person, in order to obtain from that person
information about a crime.”50 Wickersham blamed police brutality on
xenophobes who emphasized “only the diffıculties connected with immigration” and “lost sight of all its benefıcial effects.” The commission reported that immigrants were routinely scapegoated by police because it was
an “easy theory that our social diffıculties are not to be charged to our own
mistakes and failures” but the fault of “nationals of other countries.”51
Instead, Wickersham blamed the move of industry into neighborhoods,
which turned them into what he called “slum areas.”52
The friendship that Truman kept with Lowenthal was adversarial to
Hoover. Ted Morgan writes that “Truman’s antipathy toward the bureau
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was nurtured and reinforced by his friend Max Lowenthal,” who “took the
line, to which Truman was receptive, that the postwar spy scare had been
concocted by his political enemies.”53 When Truman entered the presidency in 1945, therefore, he did so with reservations about the FBI’s long
history of political and ideological scandal that targeted people with whom
the president sympathized. It was in the early years of the New Deal,
however, that the director learned to better manage his public image with
the help of Hollywood.

SPIES, DUPES, AND TRAITORS
The fear of political infıltration had captured the American imagination in
mass culture since before World War II. Beginning in 1935, Hoover routinely lent the assistance of his department to fılm producers in return for
various levels of influence over their scripts, which helped to signify and
normalize the enhanced role of the federal government in public life.54
Hoover fırst collaborated with Hollywood to make Warner Brothers’ ‘G’
Men (1935), MGM’s Whipsaw (1935), United Artists’ Let ‘Em Have It
(1935), Twentieth Century Fox’s Show Them No Mercy! (1935), and Paramount Pictures’ Mary Burns, Fugitive (1935).55 In these fılms, the FBI
represented gangsters as human vermin and thus reproduced the naturalist
language schema found in earlier urban-crime movies like United Artists’
Scarface (1932).56 These fılms draped the FBI in the conventions of realistic
fıction and illustrated what Hoover called the “Machine Gun School of
Criminology.”57 By 1939, Warner Brothers had helped to cultivate an
audience for G-man fılms but also challenged Hoover’s creative control
when it released Confessions of a Nazi Spy without his consent.58 Regardless
of the backstage bickering that followed, the fılm helped transition the
world in which the FBI operated from one that needed gangbusters to
another that required spy chasers. Confessions of a Nazi Spy was fırst
released in April 1939 and rereleased in June 1940 with updated newsreel footage. The fılm laid out the rhetorical foundations upon which
Hoover would thereafter promote his containment tactics throughout
the war and after.
Based on the 1938 discovery of Nazi intrigue in New York, Confessions of
a Nazi Spy used naturalist discourse to suggest that Germany and the Soviet
Union had organized to penetrate U.S. society and wreck its defenses. For
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example, a federal prosecutor in the fılm announced that the “invasions of
Poland, Norway, and Denmark by Nazi Germany and Russia, and Finland’s
invasion by Communist Russia” illustrated how “peaceful nations had their
entire national structures eaten away by the boring of the enemies within,”
by the “bacteria of aggressive dictatorships and totalitarian states.” He
warned that “Trojan Horses and fıfth column Bundists in these countries
threw off their masks and stabbed these countries in the back while the
wanton Nazi war machine attacked in the front.” German military forces
were described as a “plague of locusts” that were helped by “Nazi fıfth
columnists.”59 General Emilio Mola coined the fıfth column metaphor
during the Spanish Civil War when he boasted in 1936 that “four columns of
troops” had surrounded the capital city and a fıfth column of subversives
coordinated from within.60 At their core, the fıfth column and Trojan Horse
metaphors communicated an unlawful and secret relationship between
insiders and outsiders in advance of an external attack. The agony, conflict,
and competition for survival embedded within the linguistic framework of
realistic fıction, therefore, presented a political world governed by deterministic self-destruction that needed to be contained.
Confessions of a Nazi Spy helped popularize archetypal characters that
Hoover would continually reference in his offıcial discourse. Keith Booker
explains that the “three central Nazi fıgures, the fanatic intellectual, the evil
sadist, and the gullible dupe, established most the central stereotypes of
Nazis that would reappear in the numerous anti-Nazi fılms of the 1940s.”61
The identities imposed upon Nazis would be reinvented and redeployed
against Communists in later FBI collaborations like Columbia Pictures’
Walk a Crooked Mile (1948), Warner Brothers’ I Was a Communist for the
FBI (1951), and Columbia Pictures’ Walk East on Beacon (1952).62 In these
fılms, pacifısts and teachers frequently played the role of dupes to Communist agents.63 And, like the Nazis before them, Communists were regularly
portrayed as hysterical fanatics or shysters.64 These roles were not new,
however; they had been a mainstay of FBI storytelling since the start of the
New Deal.
Hoover invited former circus promoter Courtney Ryley Cooper to advertise the bureau through fıction and nonfıction formats in 1933. Cooper
reinvented the FBI according to the conventions of urban-crime storylines
and set its agents against a cast of degenerates who made containment the
only possible police strategy. Powers explains that Hoover worked with
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Cooper to develop an “FBI formula” for law enforcement propaganda. It
unifıed “all aspects of the FBI’s operations . . . into one coherent image”
and it “became the model for all future FBI publicity.”65 The formula
promoted containment rhetoric. In fılms, books, newspapers, magazines,
journals, radio programs, and comic books, Cooper tapped this framework
to lump criminals, lawyers, and politicians as well as police and prison
reformers like Wickersham and Lowenthal together in a foreign conspiracy
against Anglo America.
The formula was structured according to a popular Hollywood
schema. According to a memorandum written by Hoover in September
1934, Cooper wanted to prove that a setup existed in practically every
town whereby the gangster had “naturally assumed the place whereby he
[could] control bonds, paroles” and the like through political affıliations
and to “‘lick’ the crime problem all this must be uprooted.” Hoover told
Cooper that this generic underworld conspiracy theory was absolutely
sound.66 Although Hoover admitted to Cooper that FBI fıles contained no
information along these lines, Hoover still encouraged him to write a story
about “political affıliations in gangster activities.”67 Cooper’s theory did not
emanate from historical records but instead from realistic fıction.68 Foreignness was fırst assigned to members of the mafıa before it was reassigned
to Nazis and Communists.
Cooper helped to circulate archetypal characters that insisted upon
forms of containment. In October 1933, he proposed a story to Hoover on
an “insidious creeping process” invented by the “convicts themselves and
persons who perhaps meant well but who [had] brought about a serious
condition in this country.” In the wake of the Wickersham Commission’s
report and President Hoover’s drive for criminal rehabilitation, Cooper
wanted to write about prisons and how they had been turned into “country
clubs.” Cooper’s editor at the American Magazine sought a focus on the
manner in which various convict organizations were behind the prison
reform program and how the convicts accomplished it by threat, force, and
bribery. He suggested that this would “arouse the country to such a point
that something could be done about it” if the story indicted “the SYSTEM
and the people of the United States who [had] permitted convict coddlers to
get the upper hand.” The charge of softness mimicked the fırst generation of
realist writers who scoffed at the female novelists who preceded them as well
as the naturalists who later ridiculed the older realists for their own domes-
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ticity. The charge also preceded the accusation made by political realists
against idealists of being somehow utopian, moralistic, legalistic, or emotional. Cooper suggested that his storylines should tell of “meddling
women” and how they had “freed guilty man after guilty man.”69 This fıner
point of Cooper’s conspiracy theory was also the subject of urban-crime
plotlines; female defense attorneys were repeatedly portrayed as conflicted
by the love they felt for the men they defended.70 The character logics
circulated by Hollywood, therefore, interacted with the FBI formula and set
the bureau against soft or sentimental dupes.
Hoover’s relationship with the press not only helped him invent discourse but also to amplify his cultural presence and authority. Former
Assistant Director William C. Sullivan later revealed that the network of
fıeld offıces allowed Hoover to “place ‘news’ stories—invented and written
in the bureau, really nothing more than press releases, puff pieces for the
FBI—in newspapers around the country.” The FBI’s strength “was in the
small dailies and weeklies; and with hundreds of these papers behind him,
Hoover didn’t give a damn about papers like the New York Times or the
Washington Post.” However, Sullivan noted that “scores of Washingtonbased reporters printed stories we gave them too, and they usually printed
them under their own bylines.”71 This system of dissemination generated
thousands of news articles and editorials published in local newspapers,
credited to local newsmen, and written in the naturalist style.
Hoover used the formula and the system of dissemination to frame his
critics as dangerously naïve or disloyal. When Hoover spoke to HUAC two
weeks after the Truman Doctrine speech, for example, he argued that the
Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) was a “Fifth
Column if there ever was one,” and that the “open, avowed Communist who
carries a card and pays dues is no different from a security standpoint than
the person who does the party’s work but pays no dues, carries no card and
is not on the party rolls.” He suggested that the latter was a “greater menace
because of his opportunity to work in stealth.” This character type was that
of the dupe, who was guilty of criminal naïveté. The director scoffed that
“fellow travelers and sympathizers can deny party membership but they can
never escape the undeniable fact that they have played into the Communist
hands, thus furthering the Communist cause by playing the role of innocent, gullible or willful allies.”72 The next morning, newspapers across the
country flashed headlines that framed the CPUSA in terms of the fıfth
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column metaphor.73 The dupe identity helped Hoover limit the positionality of his critics between idealistic fools and fanatical traitors.
HUAC was sympathetic to how other quarters of Congress had chastised
the FBI director for his treatment of minorities. For example, the ICC
charged in March 1940 that Hoover’s technocratic “spy systems” and “wire
tapping” increased the “power of law-enforcement agencies to oppress
factory employees” who were under investigation “only by reason of their
views and activities in regard to labor unions and other economic
movements.”74
In February, Senator George W. Norris (Independent-NE) warned that
the “methods resorted to by the representatives of the Bureau” were “abhorrent” to “constitutional liberty” and the “rights” presumably enjoyed by
“citizens of the United States under the Constitution.”75 In January, Representative Vito Marcantonio (American Labor Party-NY) announced on the
House floor that Hoover had built a “system of terror by index cards” that
reflected “Himmler’s super secret service in Germany.” The congressman
warned that Hoover had laid the foundation for “Palmer raids, for a Palmer
system, and for a Gestapo system in the United States.”76 In response to this
realm of oversight, one of Hoover’s assistants highlighted that Lowenthal
had closely “worked with the Wickersham Committee,” which examined a
bureau case that had been “reversed by an appellate court because of ‘third
degree’ or other improper treatment of defendants.” The assistant concluded that Lowenthal was behind this “smear campaign.”77
The character logic of the dupe helped Hoover frame his contest with
Truman and congressional idealists as that between security and vulnerability. Hoover complained to HUAC in March 1947, for example, that
Communists deployed “professional smear brigades . . . against the FBI”
and enlisted “support often from apparently well-meaning but thoroughly
duped persons.”78 Oversight in law enforcement had long been described as
a Communist enterprise that exploited naïve idealism. In May 1940, for
example, Hoover told the Federation of Women’s Clubs that “the Communist charge” that he sought to create a “Gestapo” was “blustering ballyhoo
designed to cover their own ‘Trojan Horse’ activities. The Communists
hope[d] that with the FBI shackled, they can proceed without interferences
as they go their boring, undermining way to overthrow our Government”
like “infectious and deep-seated germs.”79 Hoover clearly had his longstanding feud with Lowenthal’s sympathizers in mind. The next month, for
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example, his assistant told the Michigan Banker’s Association that the
“same subversive forces which attempted to wreck America twenty years
ago . . . still hate the Federal Bureau of Investigation with rankling venom. I
am proud and happy to say that this Bureau has never weakened before its
unwarranted and false attacks in defending the principles of freedom,
democracy and liberty, in the American way.”80 The message was amplifıed
three days later when the Michigan Manufacturer and Financial Record
reprinted the speech in its entirety.81 Hoover’s speechwriters deployed the
dupe persona in ways that aligned prison and police reformers with enemies
of the state and thereby constrained what might be said against the FBI.
Hoover worked assiduously to build a rhetorical framework that Republicans and Southern Democrats would share in a united front against the
New Deal and in the name of national security. Certainly, he did not act
alone, but his offıce helped him provide rhetorical leadership to those who
did act against Truman. Ivie argues that right-wing orators like Everett
Dirksen (R-IL) fılled the rhetorical vacuum created by Truman’s reticence
and thereby informed how the administration perceived Soviet actions and
drafted the Truman Doctrine speech as well as how the speech was interpreted by the president’s audiences. Ivie notes that “voices other than
Truman’s spoke regularly of fıre, flood, and red fever, which set the rhetorical stage for a presidential declaration of global emergency. Working
within a common political culture, Truman’s speechwriters crafted an
address that prompted similar images.”82 Bostdorff adds that the congressman rose to the House floor in January 1947 to “warn his colleagues about
Communist expansion abroad. He spoke of the ‘virus’ of Communism, ‘red
fever,’ and the ‘plague’ of what he termed ‘red fascism.’”83 But Dirksen also
made the threat more local. In that speech, he warned of Communist
infıltration into government, the fılm industry, labor unions, and educational systems before he praised the work of HUAC. His speech was reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day in April 1947 under the title “Red
Fascism: Freedom Is in Jeopardy.”84
Dirksen’s rhetoric amplifıed language already deployed by Hoover. The
FBI director told the Annual Convention of the American Legion in September 1946, for example, that the “Hitler, Tojo, and Mussolini brands of
Fascism were met and defeated on the battle fıeld. All those who stand for
the American way of life must arise and defeat Red Fascism in America by
focusing upon it the spotlight of public opinion and by building up barriers
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of common decency through which it cannot penetrate.”85 Hoover reprinted the speech in the December 1946 issue of the Washington News
Digest, and he titled a February 1947 American Magazine article, “Red
Fascism in the United States Today.”86 Moreover, Ivie observes that the
language of disease combined with “images of fıre, flood, crime, and bestiality to symbolize darkness descending over the civilized world, a darkness
that reminded many of the nightmare of Munich. In the words of Congressman [Henderson] Lanham [D-GA], sending aid to Greece and Turkey was
fıghting the spread of ‘Red fascism.’”87 Lanham made this statement in May
1947 and mistakenly elaborated that this “description of the Russian system
is not original with me but was used fırst, I believe, by J. Edgar Hoover,
Director of the FBI.”88 As Hinds and Windt explain, the metaphor was
invented in the 1930s and merged divergent sets of motives, ideas, and goals
into a more singular concept of totalitarianism.89
Rather, Hoover helped repurpose and amplify the metaphor in a campaign that had always, in part, been about discrediting his political, cultural,
and institutional adversaries and limiting their potential for oversight.
Lanham celebrated that the president’s foreign policy planning had “declared war upon” Communist infıltration and would force the “Government to purge from its pay rolls any who are believers in, and followers of,
the communistic idea.”90 In practice, these people were reformers like
Wickersham and Lowenthal. Hoover directly connected the Truman Doctrine to issues of domestic security when he told HUAC in March that the
“mad march of Red Fascism” accelerated after “President Truman called for
aid to Greece and Turkey” just two weeks earlier.91 The trope deployed by
Hoover, the press, and members of Congress, therefore, compressed years
of meaning derived from past rhetoric and experiences into a more singular
expression that expanded the scope of the Truman Doctrine speech into the
realm of domestic security, or into the realm of New Deal reform politics.
Dirksen’s address illustrates the influence of the FBI’s system for disseminating messages. Hoover developed the Crime Records Division (CRD) in
the 1930s, according to Douglass M. Charles, to write articles and speeches
and thereby alter U.S. public opinion, especially in regard to the perils of
Communists and sex offenders, who were often conflated. Effectively, the
CRD operated as a liaison offıce between Hoover, the press, and Congress.92
It is not surprising, therefore, that many major tracts on red fascism from
different sources, draped in natural imagery, were printed or delivered
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between September 1946 and May 1947, all of which appeared uncoordinated and contextualized the Truman Doctrine speech. By repetition and
diversifıcation of speakers with different relationships to the president, the
FBI created a perceived consensus among public offıcials about the vulnerability of internal security to Communist intrigue, which the president
substantiated with the Truman Doctrine speech.
Some members of Congress had already accepted Hoover’s rhetorical
leadership even before George F. Kennan sent the Long Telegram on
February 22, 1946. One day earlier, Congressman John E. Rankin (D-MS)
read a speech by eugenicist Lothrop Stoddard into the Congressional Record
in which he proclaimed that the “only high-placed offıcial of our Government who has had the guts to speak out frankly about our Communists is
the one offıcial who knows by far the most about their nefarious plans, acts
and methods. This courageous individual is none other than J. Edgar
Hoover, head of the FBI.” Stoddard closed his address by asking with
naturalist language if there was a “hidden hand, reaching out from afar to
envenom our local problems and synchronize them in a manner which,
unless sternly checked and constructively dealt with, may make us helpless
at the very moment when our strength and unity are most needed in the
world?”93 Such language emerged at a time when Rankin and other congressional conservatives warned that “Reds and their fellow travelers” in the
Truman administration sought to “abolish the Committee on UnAmerican Activities and to get rid of J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI.”94
Truman’s critics not only fılled the rhetorical vacuum with right-wing
commentary, they fılled it with arguments that displaced the president’s
rhetorical authority on national security with claims that elevated and
protected Hoover in the political-cultural hierarchy.
The Truman Doctrine speech, therefore, operated in and borrowed from
the context of an anti–New Deal style, and the speech substantiated what
Truman’s rivals had long said against the New Deal. Hoover’s speech to
HUAC two weeks later was signifıcant not for any new revelation about
national security but for how it lent rhetorical authority to the president’s
critics. What made Hoover’s anti-Communist discourse appear politically
“real” was how it appropriated language from biological science to analogically explain the motivations of people who challenged the normative
structure of Anglo-American nationalism. What made his alliance with
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HUAC seem natural was the rhetorical foundations of realistic fıction and
the containment culture it encouraged in the name of America.

RACE, LABOR, AND THE AMERICAN WAY
The FBI director encouraged a nationalist response against New Deal
encroachments of traditional Anglo-American culture. Hoover reported to
HUAC in his speech of March 26, for example, that the “best anecdote to
communism [was] vigorous, intelligent, old-fashioned Americanism with
eternal vigilance.”95 This language echoed his wartime rhetoric. He exclaimed at the University of Notre Dame in May 1942, for example, that
“Red-blooded Americanism” would “not permit our Nation to bow in
defeat.”96 His discourse resuscitated rhetorical patterns born in the Progressive Era. In “What ‘Americanism’ Means” (1894), Theodore Roosevelt
addressed the state of popular fıction with gendered concerns against more
domiciliary literature. He lamented how “over-civilized, over-sensitive,
over-refıned . . . weaklings” might “write graceful and pretty verses, essays,
novels” but “lost the hardihood and manly courage” that was kept by those
“Americans” who were “strong enough to stand” on their own feet. He
further described the “undersized man of letters” as the one who fled his
“country because he, with his delicate, effeminate sensitiveness,” found the
“conditions of life on this side of the water crude” and thus took “abode in
Europe.” In particular, his words targeted the “leaders of the so-called social
world” from the “northeastern cities” who harbored a “colonial habit of
thought” and a “provincial spirit of admiration for things foreign.” He
wanted, instead, an “American literature” that encouraged “waging relentless war on rank-growing evils of all kind.”97
Roosevelt was not alone in his criticism. Reviewers soon celebrated
fıction that was “infused with red blood—the red blood that stimulates men
to the vigorous exercise of body and mind,” which was the stuff of “Americanism.” Literary critics praised the work of authors who would go on to
write the canon of literary naturalism as well as the work of Roosevelt’s
friend Owen Wister, who founded the American Western, all of who based
their work on the frontier myth.98 The Atlantic Monthly printed in 1897 that
a “Feminine Principle” in “American letters” had been replaced by a “Masculine Principle,” and that the “faith of the nation” stood “ready to be
transferred to it.” The magazine observed that American fıction was at a
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juncture that separated the departing supremacy of one principle from the
arrival of another. The new “supremacy” was related to the “Anglo-Saxon
race” and its quest to “win the entire earth for the measure of its strength.”99
Roosevelt was certainly satisfıed, for as Leroy G. Dorsey and Rachel M.
Harlow observe, he used stories of “how the North American frontier
influenced individual character” to offer a “means by which newer immigrants could become true Americans” in ways that “preserved native citizens’ understanding of American culture” with the frontier myth.100
Hoover’s appeals to red-blooded Americanism rearticulated the gendered,
militant social order that literary critics, naturalists, and political progressives promoted to adapt Anglo-American culture to the stresses of change.
The FBI director grounded Americanism in a branch of frontier mythology that emphasized Anglo-American Protestant nationalism. In June
1942, for example, he celebrated the “early Colonists who settled on our
Eastern shores,” the “Patriots who fought for freedom,” and the “Pioneers
who opened the Westward trails” in a speech at St. John’s University. Those
were the “times when faith in God, superior physical endurance, high
courage, utter fearlessness, and the ability to thrive on adversity were
requisites of success.” Such attributes, he argued, needed to be “duplicated
by our Country’s defenders if we are to preserve America for tomorrow,”
because “Americans allowed the spirit of Americanism to be drugged with
alien ideologies.” This battle was cosmic in nature and was against the “Axis
forces and the pagan evil,” which could only be met by a “superior force of
spiritual development.”101 Americanism for Hoover, like with Roosevelt
and the naturalists, was a militantly gendered construct. As he explained to
the Knights of Columbus in March 1942, the nation needed a “reborn
consecration to the militant spirit of liberty which is fundamentally American. Red-blooded men rise to action” and answer the “call to arms” when
things “American in soul and action have been challenged.” This mission
was also Puritanical. He suggested, for example, that the world was “bruised
and bleeding because the forces of the anti-Christ” had ascended “over the
forces of decency.”102 He elaborated before the New York Federation of
Women’s Clubs in May 1940 that the state of affairs called for “Americanism” and “present-day pioneering” to “perpetuate a heritage that will continue to be a beacon light of freedom and equality to oppressed peoples the
world over.”103 The rhetoric of Americanism, therefore, situated Hoover’s
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accusations against New Deal reformers in a cosmic battle between good
and evil.
What emerged from how Hoover deployed the frontier myth was a
philosophy of human nature. He told the Catholic Youth Organization in
January 1946, for example, that the FBI was an “idealistic organization” that
was “forced to deal with the harshest realities of life . . . the very dregs of
humanity, who, impelled by an anti-social attitude, prey upon society.”
From this tension, he argued, came a “sense of realism to the men and
women of the FBI.”104 Unlike the sentimentalism that Courtney Ryley
Cooper assigned to prison reformers, therefore, Hoover defıned realism in
terms of a militantly gendered attitude, hardened in a cosmic battle rooted
in the old missions to spread and perfect Christianity and democracy. This
prism, in part, informed the Truman Doctrine speech and what it implied
about New Dealers.
The FBI director fırst deployed the Americanist framework before the
wartime era, and in a way that encouraged the containment of reformers.
He applauded the American Legion as early as September 1938 for how it
protected the “principles of Americanism” from “viciously anti-American,
alien ideas and ideals, systems and policies” soon after the Legion aligned
with FDR’s congressional critics.105 In August, the Legion’s National Americanism Commission reported to Martin Dies’s (D-TX) Special Committee
on Un-American Activities that the New Deal employed Communists.106
Ira Katznelson explains that while Dies had once been an ardent New Dealer
when “he discerned no contradiction between his racism and progressive
populism,” he turned against Roosevelt when the New Deal threatened
racial segregation. Dies and other Southern Democrats began to work with
Republicans when Democrats from the North and the West moved to
federally outlaw lynching and support the effort to organize black workers
in the South and ultimately challenge Jim Crow after the National Labor
Relations Act (1935) was passed.107 The Dies Committee was an early
manifestation of Democratic defectors who sided with Republicans to stall
the New Deal, a form of coalition politics and containment culture that
would be continued by HUAC and escalated by Hoover and the FBI in the
name of anticommunism during the Cold War.
Hoover aligned his own Anglo-American nationalist rhetoric with the
discourse of mass culture in ways that implied New Dealers were fıfth
columnists. In Confessions of a Nazi Spy, for example, Joseph Goebbels
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explained to an American-Nazi propagandist that “our aim must always be
to discredit conditions there in the United States.” In particular, the German offıcial insisted that “racial and religious hatred must be fostered” and
“class hatreds must be encouraged in such a way that labor and the middle
classes will become confused and antagonistic. In the ensuing chaos, we will
be able to take control.” This scene followed another in which a member of
the American Legion shouted down the propagandist at a public assembly:
“We don’t want any ‘isms’ in this country except Americanism!”108 Hoover
substantiated this theme in a radio address delivered before the International Association of Chiefs of Police in August 1943, when he announced
that recent outbursts had pitted “race against race, creed against creed” in
which some sought to “destroy, incite, subvert, and misrepresent the truth.”
For this problem, he blamed the
subversive group—those termites of discontent and discord, always alert to
seize upon racial differences, economic stresses and political diffıculties to
advance their selfısh and venal purposes. These “ism” termites scoff at our
Democracy and belittle the cherished freedom, liberty and fair play that
characterize America. The threat against the American people from within is
not merely a Nazi threat. It is the insidious infection of other foreign ‘isms’
creeping up the pillars of the Republic under the false guise of Democracy.109

He said much the same to B’nai B’rith in a speech that was reprinted in the
Boston Post one month before Confessions of a Nazi Spy was rereleased in
June 1940.110
Hoover raised more explicit fears about civil rights reformers and organized labor in the early Cold War era, which helped shape the way Americans understood the Truman Doctrine speech. The FBI director quoted
from CPUSA literature in his February 1947 article in the American Magazine, for example, that the “American Communist” aimed to enlist the
“support of the American Negro. Under the guise of championing a just
cause, the Communist seeks to further his own diabolical ends. . . . The
class-conscious Communists recognize Negroes as merely ‘allies of the
American working class.’”111 The black community was vulnerable to communism, argued Hoover, because it would likely be hoodwinked by Communists disguised as labor organizers. This arrangement was punctuated by
Republican hostility to the National Labor Relations Board and Southern-
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Democratic anxiety about how it opened the possibility to challenge Jim
Crow. Such discourse cast suspicions upon reformers inside and outside
government.
Hoover’s accusations destabilized Truman’s broader domestic agenda
and the future of the New Deal. In September 1945, for example, the
president pledged to continue FDR’s “economic bill of rights” and to
expand programs for health, housing, education, employment, and catastrophic protection.112 Four days after Hoover spoke to Congress, however,
the New York Times paraphrased from Hoover, in part, that Communists
had built a united front so that a few leaders could influence a broad area of
American affairs. These “Russian fıfth columnists” allegedly appealed to
“workers, to Negroes, to veterans, to young peoples, and to ‘progressives’ of
every persuasion.’” The line between Communist and New Dealer was
effectively blurred. The Times emphasized that Communists wanted to
outlaw the Ku Klux Klan, wanted to abolish HUAC, and supported “higher
taxes on high incomes and lower taxes on low incomes; more housing;
bigger social security and veterans’ benefıts; Federal subsidies to farmers;
[and] legislation to protect Negroes.” The “Trojan horse,” said Hoover, had
become a “Trojan snake.” The newspaper recapped that the Communist
Party was then in a fıght for its life that “began with President Truman’s
message on foreign policy” and escalated with his executive order.113 While
the Truman Doctrine speech was constrained by a rhetoric of the past, as
Bostdorff observes, it also evidenced the presence of that familiar past and
was used by Hoover to unhinge the constraint that Truman wanted to
impose on the FBI and to undercut his social-democratic agenda.
Hoover encouraged containment culture in ways that framed the Truman Doctrine speech against the New Deal. He wrote in the February 1947
issue of the American Magazine, for example, that “the menace of Communism must be met and its forward march halted” by “Americans” if they
were to “preserve the American way of life.” He worked to redefıne what
counted as acceptable liberalism in the Cold War context. In particular,
Hoover asked his readers to dismiss a “counter tactic” that claimed “antiCommunist statements” were false “denunciations of liberals and progressives” rather than real warning against “Communists.”114 One month
later—and just two weeks after the Truman Doctrine speech—Hoover told
HUAC that “Communist propaganda” sought to be “aligned with liberal
progressive causes. The honest liberal and progressive should be alert to
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this, and I believe the Communists’ most effective foes can be real
liberals and progressives who understand their devious machinations.”115 Such use of dissociation helped Hoover to position himself as
someone who was not opposed to liberals and progressives, only opposed to
those who were not honest or real. By limiting the spectrum of politics that
liberals could advance or the positions that liberals could occupy, he practiced a mode of cultural containment that enabled his brand of anticommunism to spread. Bolstered by international events, Hoover’s schema located
social-democratic reformers and reform culture, itself, beyond the horizon
of possibility.

CONCLUSION
The FBI director rhetorically limited the presidency in ways that accelerated
Cold War realism and the red-blooded Americanism that it encouraged.
One of the president’s former colleagues from the ICC opened a law practice
and defended federal employees accused of disloyalty in the wake of Executive Order 9835. He complained to the president in 1949 and 1950 that
“FBI employees” exhibited “intellectual limitations” that were manifest in
their “investigations of the social, economic and political views and associations of private citizens.” He suggested that Hoover used this power to
investigate “Americans suspected of no criminal activity,” which marked a
“dangerous tendency toward a police state.” Accordingly, the lawyer called
upon the “executive branch of government” to examine the “extent to which
the FBI” had become a “dangerous political secret police.”116 Although
sympathetic, the president was constrained. One of Hoover’s assistants
confırmed in July 1949 that Hoover had by then successfully consolidated
his rhetorical power in the federal government. The assistant relayed a
private conversation between Truman and one of his advisors about the
emerging police structure. He wrote that the “President had made up his
mind to let the Director go” but the advisor encouraged Truman to “face
certain facts, namely the Director [was] tremendously popular throughout the country and that if the President did anything which would cause
the Director to leave, it would reflect adversely on the elections in 1950
and 1952.” Truman admitted that he knew “this was so” and decided not
to act.117
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Critics trace Truman’s rhetorical appeals to what has been summarized
as a stockpile of anti-Communist tropes and imagery that circulated in
public culture. An investigation of the naturalist stockpile illustrates
Hoover’s overarching persuasive strategy. Hoover delivered at least 21
major speeches on the subject of communism or fıfth columns between
September 1938 and March 1947, published at least 27 major articles on the
topic under his own name, and lent the FBI’s credibility to Truman’s
congressional opponents and fılms like Confessions of a Nazi Spy, much of
which was further amplifıed by the press.118 Collectively, this media repeated, in part, a message crafted in the early 1930s about New Deal reform
culture and the reformers. Among other sources, the stockpile was thus
refurbished by a sophisticated anti–New Deal message campaign that cut
across speeches, newspapers, magazines, comic strips, radio programs, and
motion pictures. The language helped create a prism that transformed
international events into evidence for Hoover’s own claims about more
local politics. Hoover did not singularly cultivate the stockpile of antiCommunist tropes, but it is diffıcult to imagine any single person who
did more to keep it freshly stocked and relevant, to circulate, inform, and
lend offıcial credibility to anti-Communist rhetoric. After all, Hoover
did not operate singularly but made himself an American institution,
made his name synonymous with the organization that he operated with
little oversight, having done much to malign his more hostile overseers
as fıfth columnists.119
The Truman Doctrine speech is rhetorically signifıcant for not only how
it formalized realism in foreign policy planning but also for its meanings
about more localized politics that arose from overlapping historical and
rhetorical contexts. Whereas Wilsonian idealism celebrated human rationality, the basic goodness of different white Christian peoples, and a harmony of interests between white Christian nations, the president’s new,
realistic perspective substantiated Hoover’s pessimistic determinism, which
placed different types of peoples in perpetual conflict. Whereas idealism had
once held out hope for an absolute form of justice, conceptualized oppositional ideology and radical activities as forms of protected speech, and
treated prison as a place of social uplift and rehabilitation, Truman’s anticommunism seemed to substantiate Hoover’s discourses on issues of law
and order, subversion, and containment. And, whereas idealism was
grounded in appeals to grace, hope, mercy, and charity, the Truman Doc-
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trine appeared to substantiate Hoover’s vision of the human condition as
naturally marked by anguish and agony. No longer could reformers talk
about racial, economic, and religious equality without raising suspicions
about disloyalty or foreign loyalties. No longer could reformers talk about
labor safeguards, disarmament, or national autonomy without raising suspicions of fanatic intellectualism, of being dupes, or of being aligned with
evil sadists. The president communicated that the contours of political
reality had suddenly changed in ways that worked against the New Deal.
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